Microeconomics Inspired Mechanisms to Manage Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

Abstract

Trying to achieve higher usage efficiency for spectrum has been on the research agenda for some time now. More efficient transmission technologies are being developed, but they alone will not solve the problem of spatially and temporally underused spectrum and radio resources. Mechanisms to optimize spectrum access over space and time are required. This paper describes schemes, based on multiple agents that collaborate to find more efficient allocation patterns in a defined coverage area. Leveraging on microeconomics inspired mechanisms, the paper describes and analyses schemes based on collaborating 'agents' (hat can be either whole operator, or BS or end user terminal) that negotiate with each other to find the most optimized allocation pattern for a given area and allocation duration. The optimization strategies investigated include both bargaining as well as auction based mechanisms. Both allow the negotiation of spectrum and radio resources, based on market driven incentives. The auction types investigated support dynamic allocations on different timescales, ranging from short to medium and long term allocation scenarios. While auctions are discussed to be used for the longer term allocations, a MAC based rental protocol is evaluated for shorter term allocations when operated either at the BS or end user terminal level. Finally, the paper discusses how the MAC based rental protocol between BSs can be implemented.