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A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in broadband networks
723
Citations
16
References
2000
Year
EngineeringDynamic Resource AllocationGame TheoryComputational Game TheoryMarket DesignPricingOperations ResearchNetwork GameNetwork OptimizationCombinatorial OptimizationMechanism DesignBroadband NetworksCongestion ManagementBandwidth AllocationElastic ServicesFair Resource AllocationGame Theoretic FrameworkFair Bandwidth AllocationEdge ComputingNetwork Traffic ControlCloud ComputingBusinessAlgorithmic Game Theory
The framework uses Nash bargaining from cooperative game theory to achieve Pareto‑optimal, fair bandwidth allocations. The paper proposes a game‑theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation of elastic services in high‑speed networks. The authors formulate a centralized optimization that is equivalent to a decentralized greedy algorithm, and they design a distributed algorithm with convergence guarantees for fair bandwidth allocation and pricing based on users’ bandwidth needs and budgets. The framework yields a fair rate allocation and pricing policy that maximizes total network revenue while respecting users’ budgets.
In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation for elastic services in high-speed networks. The framework is based on the idea of the Nash bargaining solution from cooperative game theory, which not only provides the rate settings of users that are Pareto optimal from the point of view of the whole system, but are also consistent with the fairness axioms of game theory. We first consider the centralized problem and then show that this procedure can be decentralized so that greedy optimization by users yields the system optimal bandwidth allocations. We propose a distributed algorithm for implementing the optimal and fair bandwidth allocation and provide conditions for its convergence. The paper concludes with the pricing of elastic connections based on users' bandwidth requirements and users' budget. We show that the above bargaining framework can be used to characterize a rate allocation and a pricing policy which takes into account users' budget in a fair way and such that the total network revenue is maximized.
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