P2P Incentive Model On Evolutionary Game Theory

Abstract

Conventional research on P2P incentive mechanism is based on cooperative or non-cooperative game theory. This paper assumes the node in the P2P system is limited rationality, using evolutionary game theory to study P2P incentive mechanism, we first investigate individual population P2P incentive model and model the node replicator dynamics. Mathematics analysis and numerical result shows that the individual population P2P system is stable when the node plays game as the incentive model we designed. Then we investigate the condition that the node in the P2P system with migration ability. We assume the node is divided into the different subpopulation according to the node dynamic property, we model the P2P system replicator dynamics, prove the incentive model is stable even when existing the strong dynamic node in the system. Mathematics analysis result shows that the P2P system is stable when the node plays the game as the incentive model we designed whatever the P2P system with the nature of dynamic and self-organized property.