Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

Ananish Chaudhuri, Andrew Schotter, Barry Sopher

The Economic Journal · 2008 · 164 citations · 37 references

Concepts

Abstract

We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the ‘Minimum Effort Game’ which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto‐ranked equilibria. The game is played by non‐overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter‐generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff‐dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge.

References

37