Strategic Complements

Strategic Complements is a game-theoretic property in potential games where the marginal utility of one player's action increases with the actions of others, reflecting supermodular interactions that induce monotonic best-response correspondences.

219

Publications

14.6K

Citations

334

Authors

281

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

42

Authors

334

  1. XV
    Xavier Vives

    IESE Business School, Spain

    5 publications · 1.2K citations

    5

    h-index

  2. FW
    Frank W. Heinemann

    Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany

    5 publications · 212 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. CC
    Camille Cornand

    Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France

    5 publications · 182 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. DK
    David Kelsey

    University of Exeter, United Kingdom

    5 publications · 217 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. FE
    Federico Echenique

    California Institute of Technology, United States

    5 publications · 192 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5 of 334

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 29 publications · 1K citations

    19

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 10 publications · 799 citations

    10

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 11 publications · 446 citations

    10

    h-index

  4. Games and Economic Behavior

    8 publications · 754 citations

    8

    h-index

  5. Econometrica

    5 publications · 456 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5