Strategic Complements
Strategic Complements is a game-theoretic property in potential games where the marginal utility of one player's action increases with the actions of others, reflecting supermodular interactions that induce monotonic best-response correspondences.
219
Publications
14.6K
Citations
334
Authors
281
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
42
Parents
219
Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
Russell Cooper, Andrew John · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1988 · 1.7K citations
Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
Xavier Vives · Journal of Mathematical Economics · 1990 · 936 citations
Strategic Decentralization in Channels
K. Sridhar Moorthy · Marketing Science · 1988 · 375 citations
1–5 of 219
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Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
5 publications · 212 citations
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5
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1–5 of 334
281
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
7 h-index
7 publications
626 citations
New York University
New York, United States
7 h-index
8 publications
1K citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
7 h-index
7 publications
263 citations
Technische Universität Berlin
Berlin, Germany
6 h-index
7 publications
279 citations

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Paris, France
6 h-index
6 publications
236 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
6 h-index
9 publications
620 citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
6 h-index
7 publications
308 citations

INSEAD
Fontainebleau, France
5 h-index
5 publications
431 citations
1–8 of 281
Repository · 29 publications · 1K citations
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JET · 10 publications · 799 citations
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Repository · 11 publications · 446 citations
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8 publications · 754 citations
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5 publications · 456 citations
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