The RAND Journal of Economics · 2007 · 132 citations · 16 references
Social SciencesEconomicsDecision TheoryGame TheorySocial InfluenceAccess To InformationAsymmetric InformationInformation AsymmetryInformation EconomicsInformation RevelationInformational InfluenceBargaining With Private InformationIncomplete Information EquilibriumInformation PowerLearning Under Asymmetric InformationMechanism Design Under Incomplete InformationMechanism Design Under Private InformationSignaling Under Incomplete InformationSymmetric Information Exchange
An individual (the leader) with free access to information decides how much public evidence to collect. Conditional on this information, another individual with conflicting preferences (the follower) undertakes an action that affects the payoff of both players. In this game of incomplete but symmetric information, we characterize the rents obtained by the leader as a result of his control of the generation of public information. These rents capture the degree of influence exerted by a chairman on a committee from his capacity to keep discussions alive or call a vote. Similar insights are obtained if the leader decides first how much private information he collects, and then how much verifiable information he transmits to the follower.
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Strategic Information Transmission
Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel · Econometrica · 1982 · 4.4K citations
Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
R. Benabou, J. Tirole · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2002 · 1.6K citations
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
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