Publication | Open Access
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity
383
Citations
40
References
2007
Year
NegotiationGame TheorySocial InfluenceCommunicationRumor SpreadingBehavioral Game TheoryComputational Social ScienceCollective Action ProblemNon-cooperative Game TheoryDirect ObservationMechanism DesignBehavioral SciencesGossipIndirect ReciprocityTrustGamesRepeated GameSocial BehaviorBusinessCooperative Game TheoryReputation SystemArtsSocial Topics
Human societies are saturated with gossip, which is thought to manage reputations and, through reputation effects, drive the high levels of cooperation observed in indirect reciprocity games. The study aimed to test whether gossip serves as a vector for transmitting social information in a controlled indirect reciprocity game. Fourteen groups of nine students each played a designed game that examined the content of gossip, its transmission, and the resulting behavior. Gossip strongly shaped behavior even when participants could directly observe information, demonstrating manipulative power; positive gossip about cooperators was more frequent, gossip reliably conveyed information, and cooperation rose when people encountered positive versus negative gossip.
Communication about social topics is abundant in human societies, and many functions have been attributed to such gossiping. One of these proposed functions is the management of reputations. Reputation by itself has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperation dynamics in games of indirect reciprocity, and this notion helps to explain the observed high level of cooperation in humans. Here we designed a game to test a widespread assumption that gossip functions as a vector for the transmission of social information. This empirical study (with 14 groups of nine students each) focuses on the composition of gossip, information transfer by gossip, and the behavior based on gossip information. We show that gossip has a strong influence on the resulting behavior even when participants have access to the original information (i.e., direct observation) as well as gossip about the same information. Thus, it is evident that gossip has a strong manipulative potential. Furthermore, gossip about cooperative individuals is more positive than gossip about uncooperative individuals, gossip comments transmit social information successfully, and cooperation levels are higher when people encounter positive compared with negative gossip.
| Year | Citations | |
|---|---|---|
Page 1
Page 1