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Institutional Logics and the Historical Contingency of Power in Organizations: Executive Succession in the Higher Education Publishing Industry, 1958– 1990
3K
Citations
64
References
1999
Year
Institutional EnvironmentOwnership StructureBusiness HistoryFirm PerformanceHistorical ContingencyHigher EducationManagementBusinessEducationOrganizational EconomicsEducational AdministrationInstitutional HistoryCorporate GovernanceInstitutional LogicsLeadershipOrganizational BehaviorInstitutional ChangeExecutive Succession
The study investigates how historical shifts in executive power and succession patterns unfolded within the higher education publishing industry from 1958 to 1990. Using interview data and historical analysis, the authors employ event‑history models to compare how a transition from an editorial to a market institutional logic alters the positional, relational, and economic determinants of executive succession. Results show that under an editorial logic succession hinges on organization size, structure, and author‑editor relationships, whereas under a market logic it depends on product market dynamics and corporate control competition.
This article examines the historical contingency of executive power and succession in the higher education publishing industry. We combine interview data with historical analysis to identify how institutional logics changed from an editorial to a market focus. Event history models are used to test for differences in the effects of these two institutional logics on the positional, relational, and economic determinants of executive succession. The quantitative findings indicate that a shift in logics led to different determinants of executive succession. Under an editorial logic, executive attention is directed to author‐editor relationships and internal growth, and executive succession is determined by organization size and structure. Under a market logic, executive attention is directed to issues of resource competition and acquisition growth, and executive succession is determined by the product market and the market for corporate control.
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