Communications of the ACM · 2010 · 300 citations · 7 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceComputer ArchitectureFormal MethodsOperating SystemsAssertion-based VerificationFunctional VerificationKernel ArchitectureKernel DesignKernel ProgrammingVerificationFormal VerificationSystem-level Verification
We report on the formal, machine-checked verification of the seL4 microkernel from an abstract specification down to its C implementation. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, hardware, and boot code. seL4 is a third-generation microkernel of L4 provenance, comprising 8700 lines of C and 600 lines of assembler. Its performance is comparable to other high-performance L4 kernels. We prove that the implementation always strictly follows our high-level abstract specification of kernel behavior. This encompasses traditional design and implementation safety properties such as that the kernel will never crash, and it will never perform an unsafe operation. It also implies much more: we can predict precisely how the kernel will behave in every possible situation.
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The protection of information in computer systems
Jerome H. Saltzer, Michael Schroeder · Proceedings of the IEEE · 1975 · 1.9K citations
Protection of information in computer systems
Jerome H. Saltier, Michael P. Schroeder · IEEE CSIT Newsletter · 1975 · 1.4K citations
Formal certification of a compiler back-end or
Xavier Leroy · 2006 · 652 citations