Hardware Trojan detection using exhaustive testing of k-bit subspaces

Nicole Lesperance, Shrikant Kulkarni, Kwang‐Ting Cheng

2015 · 27 citations · 15 references

Concepts

Abstract

Post-silicon hardware Trojan detection is challenging because the attacker only needs to implement one of many possible design modifications, while the verification effort must guarantee the absence of all imaginable malicious circuitry. Existing test generation strategies for Trojan detection use controllability and observability metrics to limit the modifications targeted. However, for cryptographic hardware, the n plaintext bits are ideal for an attacker to use in Trojan triggering because the size of n prohibits exhaustive testing, and all n bits have identical controllability, making it impossible to bias testing using existing methods. Our detection method addresses this difficult case by observing that an attacker can realistically only afford to use a small subset, k, of all n possible signals for triggering. By aiming to exhaustively cover all possible k subsets of signals, we guarantee detection of Trojans using less than k plaintext bits in the trigger. We provide suggestions on how to determine k, and validate our approach using an AES design.

References

15