The RAND Journal of Economics · 1994 · 159 citations · 23 references
Public AffairsEconomicsRegulatory PolicyRegulatory DesignRegulatory EconomicsRegulatory TheoryInvestment PolicyMarket RegulationRate RegulationRegulationRegulatory Policy DesignEconomic Theory Of RegulationEfficiencyNash Equilibrium PricingRegulation TheoryRepeated Game EquilibriaRepeated Game ModelsRepeated Game TheorySubgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
In this article, we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment. Rate-of-return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate-of-return regulation without such a commitment. Furthermore, rate-of-return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion, assuming that the regulator is unable to make state-contingent transfer payments.
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Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
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