Repeated Game Models is a theoretical framework in game theory that extends static strategic interactions by modeling sequential decision-making over multiple rounds, thereby allowing for the analysis of equilibrium strategies sustained by reputational concerns, reciprocity, and future consequences.
684
Publications
49.7K
Citations
1.1K
Authors
562
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
108
Parents
Publications
684
Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
Rosemarie Nagel · American Economic Review · 2007 · 1.5K citations
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
Dilip Abreu · Econometrica · 1988 · 1.3K citations
1–5 of 684
Authors
1.1K
- DF
14
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13
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10
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9
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7
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1–5 of 1.1K
Institutions
562
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
21 h-index
35 publications
2.6K citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
18 h-index
29 publications
4.9K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
17 h-index
24 publications
2.5K citations
Princeton University
Princeton, United States
16 h-index
22 publications
1.4K citations
New York University
New York, United States
15 h-index
18 publications
1.2K citations
Decision Sciences (United States)
Fort Walton Beach, United States
13 h-index
19 publications
1.1K citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
13 h-index
19 publications
5.2K citations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
12 h-index
15 publications
1.1K citations
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Venues
- Econometrica
37 publications · 9.3K citations
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- Games and Economic Behavior
41 publications · 3.3K citations
24
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- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 31 publications · 2.5K citations
22
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- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Repository · 29 publications · 746 citations
17
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- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 35 publications · 939 citations
16
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