Management Science · 2014 · 245 citations · 50 references
ManagementBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAuction TheoryExperimental EconomicsIncentive SystemsAuction DesignAuction ExperimentsAuction FormatsBehavioral IncentivesIndividual IncentivesMonetary IncentivesAuction-based IncentivesCrowdsourced ParticipationCrowdsourcingRandomized Field ExperimentsSolution Quality Assessment
To explore the effects of different incentives on crowdsourcing participation and submission quality, we conduct a randomized field experiment on Taskcn, a large Chinese crowdsourcing site using mechanisms with features of an all-pay auction. In our study, we systematically vary the size of the reward as well as the presence of a soft reserve, or early high-quality submission. We find that a higher reward induces significantly more submissions and submissions of higher quality. In comparison, we find that high-quality users are significantly less likely to enter tasks where a high-quality solution has already been submitted, resulting in lower overall quality in subsequent submissions in such soft reserve treatments. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1845 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
50
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
James J. Heckman · Econometrica · 1979 · 28.9K citations
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Edward P. Lazear, Sherwin Rosen · Journal of Political Economy · 1981 · 4.6K citations · Full text
Performance Pay and Productivity
Edward P. Lazear · American Economic Review · 2000 · 2.5K citations
Glenn W. Harrison, John A. List · Journal of Economic Literature · 2004 · 2.1K citations · Full text