Dear Enemies and the Prisoner's Dilemma: Why Should Territorial Neighbors Form Defensive Coalitions?

Thomas Getty

American Zoologist · 1987 · 181 citations · 13 references

Concepts

Abstract

Game-theoretic arguments are used to derive two new hypotheses to explain why territorial residents so consistently defeat potential usurpers. Both hypotheses are based on help from established, familiar neighbors. The first hypothesis follows simply from Krebs' (1982) assertion that the value of a territory to a usurper must be decremented by the costs of negotiating dear-enemy relationships with the remaining neighbors. An implication is that the remaining neighbors will also have to pay these renegotiation costs if the usurper succeeds. The first hypothesis is that it may benefit a territorial animal to help its established neighbors defend so it can avoid having to renegotiate territorial boundaries with a new, unfamiliar neighbor. This hypothesis assumes net positive benefits to helping without requiring reciprocation.

References

13