American Zoologist · 1987 · 181 citations · 13 references
Life SciencesEconomicsAnimal BehaviorBehavioral EcologyGame TheoryAnimal CooperationBehavioral Game TheoryDeterrence TheoryDominance HierarchiesEvolution Of CooperationTerritorial BehaviorCooperation In Social DilemmasDear Enemy EffectNet Positive ImpactPrisoner’s DilemmaRenegotiationRenegotiation EffectsTerritorial DefenseTerritory Defense
Game-theoretic arguments are used to derive two new hypotheses to explain why territorial residents so consistently defeat potential usurpers. Both hypotheses are based on help from established, familiar neighbors. The first hypothesis follows simply from Krebs' (1982) assertion that the value of a territory to a usurper must be decremented by the costs of negotiating dear-enemy relationships with the remaining neighbors. An implication is that the remaining neighbors will also have to pay these renegotiation costs if the usurper succeeds. The first hypothesis is that it may benefit a territorial animal to help its established neighbors defend so it can avoid having to renegotiate territorial boundaries with a new, unfamiliar neighbor. This hypothesis assumes net positive benefits to helping without requiring reciprocation.
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