Renegotiation Effects

Renegotiation Effects is a theoretical construct in auction theory that explains how the expectation of post-auction contract adjustments mitigates the adverse consequences of information asymmetry inherent in the Winner's Curse.

72

Publications

5.1K

Citations

112

Authors

105

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

12

Authors

112

  1. NB
    Nittai Bergman

    Tel Aviv University, Israel

    3 publications · 159 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. RJ
    Ricardo J. Enriquez

    Harvard University Press, United States

    3 publications · 159 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. DW
    Daniel Wangerin

    University of Wisconsin–Madison, United States

    2 publications · 167 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. FD
    Francesco Decarolis

    Bocconi University, Italy

    2 publications · 210 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. RG
    Ricard Gil

    Queen's University, Canada

    2 publications · 100 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 112

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 16 publications · 514 citations

    13

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 3 publications · 139 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. Journal of Accounting and Economics

    2 publications · 263 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. The Review of Economic Studies

    2 publications · 337 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. National Bureau of Economic Research

    Repository · 2 publications · 45 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5