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Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects
232
Citations
71
References
2003
Year
Behavioral Decision MakingSocial PsychologySubstantial Framing EffectsCognitionDeep ThoughtsAttentionCognitive PragmaticPsychologySocial SciencesJustification ElicitationShallow FramesExperimental PragmaticPhilosophy Of MindCognitive ConstructionExperimental Decision MakingEvaluative ProcessingBiasMore ThoughtCognitive AnalysisCognitive Bias MitigationCognitive FactorCognitive ScienceBehavioral SciencesMessage FramingHuman CognitionReference FrameExperimental PsychologySocial CognitionFraming EffectsCognitive DynamicsArtsPersuasionCognitive Psychology
The study investigates whether increased deliberation reduces framing effects in decision problems. The authors conducted two studies, measuring participants’ Need for Cognition and, in Study 1, asking half to justify choices, while in Study 2 participants responded to both frames in a within‑subjects design. Framing effects remained robust despite increased deliberation, and Need for Cognition was unrelated to initial frame responses, but high‑NC participants were more consistent across frames, indicating that deeper thought promotes normative consistency when principles are evident. © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Abstract This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within‐subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high‐NC, compared to low‐NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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