Adaptive agents in a persistent shout double auction

Chris Preist, Maarten van Tol

1998 · 96 citations · 6 references

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Abstract

CIiff [7J has demonstrated that simple, adaptive agents are able to trade in a form of double auction marketplace, in such a way that trade prices converge towards the equilibrium price of the marketplace. However, the marketplace within which the agents trade is unrealistic. In this paper, we consider a more realiitic form of double auction marke~thepersistent shout double auction. We present agents based on the ZIP agents of (Xi [7J, but with an alternative set of heuristics for use within this auction. We demonstrate that the resulting agents achieve equilibrium signifkantly faster than ZIP agents do, maintain a more stable equilibrium, and are more robust to changes in learning rate.

References

6