The Computational Metaphor of Mind: More Bugs in the Program

Abstract

The "COMPUTATIONAL METAPHOR OF MIND" has gained currency in cognitive science, computer science, philosophy, and, not least, in the popular imagination. In "Mind and Metaphor" (1995) and "Language, Thought, and Computation" (1997), Mario Radovan canvassed the strengths and weaknesses of the metaphor as a tool of inquiry. This article uses recent developments in the application of theory to metaphor, including the topics of vagueness (vs. explanation), emergent features, the indefiniteness of a grouping, and shifts in the order of terms in the metaphor to test the general and implicit weaknesses of this particular use of metaphor. The metaphor is pervasively vague and can even lead to contradictory claims, but, interestingly, it can be rescued from false uses of the homunculus problem.