American Economic Review · 2014 · 32 citations · 32 references
BusinessEconomicsAuction TheoryGame TheoryMicroeconomicsAuction DesignBidder Valuation ModelsCommon-value AuctionsInformation RevelationPrivate-value AuctionsAggregation Of SignalsCommon Value BiddingCommon Values Auction ModelsEfficiency With Incomplete InformationIncomplete Information AuctionsSignal Structure In AuctionsSymmetric Games
We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z > k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions, there are symmetric equilibria where the auction price aggregates no information. Moreover, market statistics other than price (e.g., the amount of rationing or the bid distribution) contain extra information about the state. In contrast, in standard large auctions without actions, the price aggregates all relevant information. (JEL D44, D82, D83)
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Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Andrew Weiss · American Economic Review · 1981 · 12.9K citations · Full text
American Economic Review · 2012 · 6.8K citations
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Paul Milgrom, Robert J. Weber · Econometrica · 1982 · 3.8K citations