Price and Authority in Inter-Profit Center Transactions

Robert G. Eccles, Harrison C. White

American Journal of Sociology · 1988 · 266 citations · 22 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Price and authority are traditionally viewed as alternative mechanisms for resource allocation, yet actual transactions can be evaluated by how much they combine both mechanisms. The study examines three common transfer pricing policies for inter‑profit‑center goods exchanges in a multi‑profit‑center firm. The mechanisms differ: autonomous transfers rely mainly on price, full‑cost transfers rely heavily on authority, and market‑based transfers combine both price and authority. All three policies can incur higher transaction costs internally than externally.

Abstract

Price and authority have traditionally been regarded as alternative social mechanisms for allocating resources. However, actual transactions-whether inter- or intrafirm-can be evaluated in terms of the extent to which they combine both of these mechanisms. An especially revealing example of this is the exchange of goods between two profit centers in the multi-profit center firm. Three of the most common arrangements, or transfer pricing polices, for effecting these transactions are examined here. Exchange autonomy transfers depend primarily on price, with no or minimal use of authority. Mandated full cost transfers involve a substantial exercise of authority relative to the use of price. Mandated market based transfers use both authority and price in important ways. For all three policies, the transaction costs of these internal transactions may exceed these costs on external transactions.

References

22