Year-End Tax Planning of Top Management: Evidence from High-Frequency Payroll Data

Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Søren Leth‐Petersen, Peer Ebbesen Skov

American Economic Review · 2014 · 25 citations · 5 references

Concepts

Abstract

Using Danish high-frequency payroll data and tax reform variation, we detect year-end tax avoidance among top managers. Five to seven percent of top managers exploit year-end tax planning strategies to save taxes. Around 30 percent of the top managers engaging in year-end tax avoidance do so by retiming bonus payments while the rest shift regular wage income. However, bonus timing is most tax-sensitive. When considering all of the top managers receiving a December bonus, we find that more than one-quarter retime the bonus payment, whereas only 5 percent of those not receiving a bonus shift regular wage income.

References

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