The Economic Journal · 2007 · 51 citations · 24 references
Social SciencesEconomicsBehavioral EconomicsDecision TheoryGame TheoryAsymmetric InformationBargaining TheoryBehavioral Game TheoryInformation AsymmetryNash EquilibriumBargaining EquilibriumComparative Statics Under UncertaintyNoncooperative Bargaining Models
Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually "increase" the asymmetry of payoff division if unanimity is not required. This is because responders may be willing to accept a lower share rather than risk being left out. Inequity aversion may also affect comparative statics: the advantage of being the proposer can "decrease" as players become more impatient. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
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