Bargaining Equilibrium

Bargaining Equilibrium is a theoretical construct in game theory that designates a stable outcome of strategic negotiation processes in which no party can achieve a better payoff by unilaterally altering their strategy, given the balance of concessions and demands under specified rules of interaction.

699

Publications

84.8K

Citations

890

Authors

447

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

53

Authors

890

  1. KB
    Ken Binmore

    University College London, United Kingdom

    12 publications · 3K citations

    12

    h-index

  2. AE
    Alvin E. Roth

    Stanford University, United States

    12 publications · 1.4K citations

    12

    h-index

  3. AR
    Ariel Rubinstein

    Tel Aviv University, Israel

    10 publications · 9.2K citations

    10

    h-index

  4. NA
    Nejat Anbarcı

    Deakin University, Australia

    9 publications · 211 citations

    9

    h-index

  5. MM
    Michael Maschler

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    8 publications · 1.8K citations

    8

    h-index

1–5 of 890

Venues

  1. Econometrica

    53 publications · 20.8K citations

    38

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 40 publications · 3.2K citations

    27

    h-index

  3. Games and Economic Behavior

    35 publications · 2K citations

    23

    h-index

  4. The Review of Economic Studies

    24 publications · 2.4K citations

    20

    h-index

  5. International Journal of Game Theory

    26 publications · 1.9K citations

    18

    h-index

1–5