Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Drew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin · Econometrica · 1986 · 2.4K citations

Social Sciences, Economics, Behavioral Economics +15

Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information

Edward J. Green, Robert H. Porter · Econometrica · 1984 · 2.1K citations

Social Sciences, Business Economics, Economics +11

Social Norms and Community Enforcement

Michihiro Kandori · The Review of Economic Studies · 1992 · 1.6K citations

Social Sciences, Economics, Collective Behavior +12

Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti · Econometrica · 1990 · 1.3K citations

Social Sciences, Economics, Behavioral Economics +16

The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eric Maskin · Econometrica · 1994 · 815 citations · Full text

Social Sciences, Economics, Agency Theory +16