Extensive-form Games

Extensive-Form Games is a formal representation of a game in game theory that specifies the sequence of players' decisions, their available actions at each decision point, the information available to them, and the resulting payoffs, thereby modeling strategic interactions with explicit temporal and informational structure.

1.3K

Publications

99K

Citations

1.7K

Authors

744

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

133

Authors

1.7K

  1. DF
    Drew Fudenberg

    Harvard University, United States

    16 publications · 1.1K citations

    15

    h-index

  2. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    21 publications · 654 citations

    14

    h-index

  3. MB
    Michael Bowling

    University of Alberta, Canada

    13 publications · 1K citations

    13

    h-index

  4. ST
    S.H. Tijs

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    14 publications · 396 citations

    12

    h-index

  5. GF
    Gabriele Farina

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    11 publications · 165 citations

    10

    h-index

1–5 of 1.7K

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    96 publications · 11.4K citations

    38

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 65 publications · 5K citations

    34

    h-index

  3. International Journal of Game Theory

    96 publications · 9.3K citations

    33

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    35 publications · 7.8K citations

    30

    h-index

  5. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

    48 publications · 2.7K citations

    26

    h-index

1–5