Extensive-form Games
Extensive-Form Games is a formal representation of a game in game theory that specifies the sequence of players' decisions, their available actions at each decision point, the information available to them, and the resulting payoffs, thereby modeling strategic interactions with explicit temporal and informational structure.
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Publications
99K
Citations
1.7K
Authors
744
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
133
1.3K
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Michihiro Kandori, George J. Mailath, Rafael Rob · Econometrica · 1993 · 2.1K citations
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Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
20 h-index
78 publications
2.9K citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
20 h-index
32 publications
3.7K citations

University of Alberta
Edmonton, Canada
19 h-index
65 publications
5.8K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
18 h-index
34 publications
2.3K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
18 h-index
25 publications
3.4K citations

Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv, Israel
17 h-index
26 publications
1.6K citations

Tilburg University
Tilburg, The Netherlands
16 h-index
35 publications
1.1K citations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
16 h-index
29 publications
2.1K citations
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96 publications · 11.4K citations
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JET · 65 publications · 5K citations
34
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96 publications · 9.3K citations
33
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35 publications · 7.8K citations
30
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48 publications · 2.7K citations
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