Extensive Form Representation

Extensive Form Representation is a game-theoretic model that specifies the sequential structure of a strategic interaction by detailing the order of play, the information available to players at each decision point, and the payoffs associated with final outcomes, thereby distinguishing it from simultaneous-move representations like normal-form games.

76

Publications

8.7K

Citations

113

Authors

79

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

7

Variants

Extensive Form

Authors

113

  1. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    4 publications · 63 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. AR
    Amnon Rapoport

    University of Arizona, United States

    3 publications · 217 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. GJ
    George J. Mailath

    University of Pennsylvania, United States

    3 publications · 108 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. LS
    Larry Samuelson

    University of Wisconsin–Madison, United States

    3 publications · 108 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. KR
    Klaus Ritzberger

    Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Austria

    3 publications · 153 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 113

Venues

  1. International Journal of Game Theory

    8 publications · 282 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 6 publications · 371 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. Games and Economic Behavior

    5 publications · 1.8K citations

    5

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 4 publications · 144 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Econometrica

    4 publications · 556 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5