Extensive Form Representation
Extensive Form Representation is a game-theoretic model that specifies the sequential structure of a strategic interaction by detailing the order of play, the information available to players at each decision point, and the payoffs associated with final outcomes, thereby distinguishing it from simultaneous-move representations like normal-form games.
76
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8.7K
Citations
113
Authors
79
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
7
Variants
Extensive Form
Parents
76
Game theory: analysis of conflict
Roger B. Myerson · Choice Reviews Online · 1992 · 3.4K citations
Game theory: Analysis of conflict
Ehud Kalai · Games and Economic Behavior · 1991 · 1.4K citations
An Approach to Communication Equilibria
Françoise Forges · Econometrica · 1986 · 393 citations
Game theory: Analysis of conflict
Long Range Planning · 1992 · 346 citations
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Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Austria
3 publications · 153 citations
3
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1–5 of 113
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Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
4 h-index
6 publications
1.5K citations
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
4 h-index
10 publications
166 citations
University of Arizona
Tucson, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
217 citations
University of Wisconsin–Madison
Madison, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
108 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
481 citations
University of California, Davis
Davis, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
27 citations
Bielefeld University
Bielefeld, Germany
2 h-index
4 publications
76 citations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
2 h-index
3 publications
224 citations
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8 publications · 282 citations
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Repository · 6 publications · 371 citations
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5 publications · 1.8K citations
5
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JET · 4 publications · 144 citations
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4 publications · 556 citations
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