Institutional Reform of Federalism: Changing the Players Rather Than the Rules of the Game

Abstract

Abstract The inconsistent policy outcomes, the increasing cantonal veto‐power and the general lack of central governance capacity are the main criticisms addressed when discussing Swiss federalism. This article examines the variables that are likely to modify the federal configuration in order to provide conclusions about the necessity of institutional reforms of federalism. It argues that the belief in the necessity for institutional reforms is derived from a purely institutionalist approach to Swiss federalism which tends to neglect important explanatory factors, e.g. the strategic interaction of decision makers. Consequently, it seems more promising to change the dominant strategies of the decision makers and the implementing authorities. Thus, the federal government could make it profitable for the cantons to rely on the center for assistance in order to gain control over the policy outcomes; and the cantons' veto‐position could be tempered by a more systematic integration of cantons as institutionalized corporate actors.