Journal of European Public Policy · 2005 · 129 citations · 28 references
Public AffairsPublic GovernancePublic PolicyAgency TheoryInstitutional TheoryUrban GovernanceCohesion PolicyEuropean GovernanceEuropean IntegrationEuropean PoliticsMulti-level GovernancePolicy ImplementationActorsEuropean Union Policy-makingPrincipal-agent ArrangementsPrincipal-agent NegotiationUrban Policy Implementation
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyse who controls the implementation of EU cohesion policy. The main argument is that EU control mechanisms are weak and that the goals formulated at the EU level are likely to be remoulded in the implementation process in order to suit the preferences of the implementing actors at the national level. In order to make this argument it is necessary to move beyond the traditional approach to EU cohesion policy, i.e. the multi-level governance model. I suggest the principal–agent framework as an alternative approach. An inspection of EU cohesion policy through the lenses of this approach uncovers serious implementation problems. The empirical relevance of this argument is demonstrated in a study of the implementation of a selected area of EU cohesion policy, the Urban Community Initiative.
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American Economic Review · 2013 · 8.3K citations
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
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