Labour · 2007 · 64 citations · 31 references
Social SciencesEconomicsHigher EducationEconometricsLabor EconomicsRecruitmentCareer DevelopmentPersonnel EconomicsPersonnel SelectionSelection BiasWage DeterminationModel Selection BiasQualificationSelection Bias AnalysisTreatment Effect EstimationUnobservable Inputs
Abstract. In this paper, we address the question of the early careers of French PhD graduates in science and engineering sciences in 1996. Post‐doctoral training was initially developed for PhD graduates wishing to embark on a career in the public sector. However, a large proportion of post‐doctorate graduates turn to the private sector, and in particular to occupations that do not involve research. The question we raise is that of the wage premium on post‐doctoral training. To control for selection bias arising in the case where unobservable elements are correlated between participation and wages, we first estimate a treatment effect model. The main finding is that when selection bias is not controlled for, post‐doctoral participation increases earnings; however, when selection bias is controlled for, the participation in a post‐doctoral programme has no positive effect. With regards to this finding we show that post‐doctoral programmes play much more the role of a signal in the first stage of a career. This finding is also reinforced when we use a bivariate selection rule to control for the endogenous nature of having been recruited in the private sector.
31
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Edward P. Lazear, Sherwin Rosen · Journal of Political Economy · 1981 · 4.6K citations · Full text
John Bound, David A. Jaeger, Regina Baker · Journal of the American Statistical Association · 1995 · 3.7K citations