2012 · 26 citations · 4 references
Hardware TrojanEngineeringVlsi DesignHardware AlgorithmComputer ArchitectureSide-channel AttackHardware SecurityGlitch-free ImplementationHardware Security SolutionParallel ComputingFpga SeriesComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceFpga DesignCryptographyHardware AccelerationParallel ProgrammingFpga ResourcesSide-channel Leakage
Due to the propagation of the glitches in combinational circuits side-channel leakage of the masked S-boxes realized in hardware is a known issue. Our contribution in this paper is to adopt a masked AES S-box circuit according to the FPGA resources in order to avoid the glitches. Our design is suitable for the 5, 6, and 7 FPGA series of Xilinx although our practical investigations are performed using a Virtex-5 chip. In short, compared to the original design synthesized by automatic tools while requiring the same area (slice count) our design reduces power consumption, critical path delay, and more importantly the side-channel leakage. In our practical investigations we could not recover any first-order leakage of our design using up to 50 million traces. However, since the targeted S-box realizes a first-order boolean masking, the second-order leakage could be revealed using around 25 million measurements.
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Adi Shamir · Communications of the ACM · 1979 · 13.2K citations · Full text
Side-Channel Resistant Crypto for Less than 2,300 GE
Axel Pöschmann, Amir Moradi, Khoongming Khoo et al. · Journal of Cryptology · 2010 · 196 citations · Full text
Hardware Security, Electrical Engineering, Cryptographic Primitive +7