Governance · 2012 · 856 citations · 72 references
Public AffairsPublic AdministrationPublic PolicyAgency TheoryInstitutional TheoryPolitical SociologyAccountabilityAnti-corruption GovernanceAnti-corruption MeasuresAnti-corruption PolicyAnti-corruption ReformAnti-corruption InstitutionsAnti-corruption MechanismsCollective Action Against CorruptionInterview Study DesignPrincipal-agent ArrangementsPrincipal-agent IncentivesPrincipalsSystemic Corruption
Corruption harms development, making anti‑corruption strategies a policy priority, yet few successes have emerged in highly corrupt countries. Based on interviews in Kenya and Uganda, the study argues that reforms fail because they mischaracterize systemic corruption as a principal–agent problem. The analysis shows that in thoroughly corrupt settings corruption behaves as a collective action problem, undermining reforms that assume non‑corruptible principals.
With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so‐called principals for granted.
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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Barry C. Field · Land Economics · 1992 · 19.2K citations · Full text