The Review of Economic Studies · 1992 · 509 citations · 9 references
Social SciencesEconomicsDecentralizationMacroeconomicsMicroeconomicsConsumer TheoryHousehold EconomicsInformation AsymmetryInformation EconomicsMechanism DesignWelfare EconomicsExistence Of Efficient AllocationsExistence Of Pareto OptimaMechanism Design Under Private InformationOptimal ConsumptionRecursive Utility Models
This paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers, each of whom is subject to private, idiosyncratic taste shocks. We propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are Pareto optimal within this set. The method is applied to several parametric examples. We find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases, with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources. We discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements.
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