ANTICOMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF MARKET-SHARE DISCOUNTS AND OTHER INCENTIVES TO EXCLUSIVE DEALING

Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto, Neil W. Averitt

2016 · 33 citations · 0 references

Concepts

Abstract

The traditional analysis governing arrangements has focused on a manufacturer's requirement that its distributors deal exclusively with it. In recent years, however, some manufacturers have begun to use subtler arrangements in which incentives replace requirements and partial exclusivity replaces total exclusivity. For example, rather than requiring absolute exclusivity, a manufacturer simply may give a more favorable price to customers who purchase more than a certain percentage of their requirements from the manufacturer. Such arrangements, commonly called market-share discounts, raise two questions: First, how should antitrust law assess the competitive implications of such arrangements? Second, does the law of prevent antitrust from reaching these agreements, given that they appear on their face to involve neither exclusive dealing nor requirements?