Winner's Curse

Winner's Curse is a phenomenon in auction theory wherein the winning bidder, belonging to the class of strategic outcomes in common value auctions, is distinguished by having overestimated the item's value and consequently pays more than its true worth, leading to a loss despite winning the auction.

192

Publications

14.7K

Citations

281

Authors

205

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

18

Authors

281

  1. JH
    John H. Kagel

    The Ohio State University, United States

    8 publications · 1.2K citations

    8

    h-index

  2. DL
    Dan Levin

    The Ohio State University, United States

    7 publications · 983 citations

    7

    h-index

  3. MH
    Max H. Bazerman

    Harvard University, United States

    5 publications · 549 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. JB
    Jeremy Bulow

    Stanford University, United States

    4 publications · 607 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. PK
    Paul Klemperer

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 607 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5 of 281

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 20 publications · 901 citations

    14

    h-index

  2. Econometrica

    8 publications · 1.3K citations

    8

    h-index

  3. American Economic Review

    6 publications · 891 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. Management Science

    5 publications · 239 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. Public Choice

    4 publications · 535 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5