Affiliated Values Auctions is a theoretical auction framework in which bidders’ private valuations are affiliated signals, meaning that the observed signal of one bidder provides informative content about the signals—and thus the bidding behavior—of others, leading to strategic interdependence in bidding strategies under incomplete information.
16
Publications
902
Citations
27
Authors
22
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
1
Parents
Publications
16
Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance
Ronald M. Harstad, Michael H. Rothkopf · Operations Research · 1995 · 41 citations
1–5 of 16
Authors
27
- HJ
4
h-index
- SOSérgio O. Parreiras
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States
2 publications · 55 citations
2
h-index
- TL
2
h-index
- RMRonald M. Harstad
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, United States
2 publications · 447 citations
2
h-index
- SC
2
h-index
1–5 of 27
Institutions
22
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
110 citations
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
194 citations
Amazon (United States)
Seattle, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
71 citations
The University of Melbourne
Melbourne, Australia
2 h-index
2 publications
42 citations
Georgetown University
Washington, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
42 citations
Seoul National University
Seoul, South Korea
2 h-index
2 publications
42 citations
Texas Tech University
Lubbock, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
71 citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
68 citations
1–8 of 22
Venues
- Games and Economic Behavior
2 publications · 59 citations
2
h-index
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Repository · 2 publications · 53 citations
2
h-index
- Journal of Applied Econometrics
1 publications · 135 citations
1
h-index
- Econometrica
1 publications · 406 citations
1
h-index
- Applied Economics Letters
1 publications · 18 citations
1
h-index
1–5