Weber Set

The Weber Set is a solution concept in cooperative game theory that consists of all payoff vectors obtainable through balanced contributions across coalitions, distinguished by its derivation from marginal worth vectors associated with random orderings of players.

77

Publications

3.7K

Citations

100

Authors

58

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

11

Authors

100

  1. ST
    S.H. Tijs

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    5 publications · 215 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. LA
    Lawrence A. Scaff

    University of Arizona, United States

    2 publications · 124 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. SZ
    Sırma Zeynep Alparslan Gök

    Süleyman Demirel University, Türkiye

    2 publications · 71 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. RB
    R. Brânzei

    Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Romania

    2 publications · 71 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. LS
    Lewis S. Feuer

    University of Toronto, Canada

    2 publications · 43 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 100

Venues

  1. International Journal of Game Theory

    5 publications · 109 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. Choice Reviews Online

    CRO · 5 publications · 526 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

    3 publications · 159 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. The American Historical Review

    AHR · 3 publications · 275 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Journal of Classical Sociology

    JCS · 2 publications · 50 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5