Vote-Maximizing Models is a theoretical framework in political science that belongs to the class of electoral incentive models, distinguished by its assumption that politicians rationally pursue policy positions and strategic behaviors aimed at maximizing vote share in competitive elections.
40
Publications
2.4K
Citations
53
Authors
43
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
4
Parents
Publications
40
Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality elections
André Blais, Richard Nadeau, Elisabeth Gidengil et al. · Electoral Studies · 2001 · 199 citations
1–5 of 40
Authors
53
- NS
4
h-index
- EL
3
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- JM
3
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- GA
2
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- IS
2
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1–5 of 53
Institutions
43
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
363 citations
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
350 citations
Washington University in St. Louis
St Louis, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
336 citations
National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
56 citations
University of California, Santa Barbara
Santa Barbara, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
101 citations
Aarhus University
Aarhus, Denmark
2 h-index
2 publications
116 citations
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
34 citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
265 citations
1–8 of 43
Venues
- Public Choice
4 publications · 85 citations
4
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- European Journal of Political Research
2 publications · 140 citations
2
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- American Political Science Review
2 publications · 64 citations
2
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- Social Choice and Welfare
2 publications · 45 citations
2
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- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 2 publications · 50 citations
2
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1–5