Electoral Incentives

Electoral Incentives is a political economy concept that denotes the set of strategic motivations and constraints that office-seeking politicians and parties face because their continued tenure depends on winning competitive elections, thereby inducing them to select policies, allocate resources, and adopt institutional positions in ways expected to maximize electoral support.

957

Publications

78.9K

Citations

1.3K

Authors

557

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

218

Authors

1.3K

  1. SA
    Scott Ashworth

    University of Chicago, United States

    8 publications · 1.1K citations

    8

    h-index

  2. JA
    James Adams

    University of California, Davis, United States

    7 publications · 864 citations

    7

    h-index

  3. JM
    James M. Snyder

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    7 publications · 946 citations

    7

    h-index

  4. EB
    Ethan Bueno de Mesquita

    University of Chicago, United States

    7 publications · 825 citations

    7

    h-index

  5. MM
    Massimo Morelli

    Bocconi University, Italy

    6 publications · 311 citations

    6

    h-index

1–5 of 1.3K

Venues

  1. American Journal of Political Science

    AJPS · 57 publications · 8.5K citations

    44

    h-index

  2. The Journal of Politics

    JP · 69 publications · 6.6K citations

    43

    h-index

  3. American Political Science Review

    47 publications · 5.8K citations

    35

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 100 publications · 3.2K citations

    30

    h-index

  5. Comparative Political Studies

    CPS · 31 publications · 2.6K citations

    26

    h-index

1–5