Electoral Incentives
Electoral Incentives is a political economy concept that denotes the set of strategic motivations and constraints that office-seeking politicians and parties face because their continued tenure depends on winning competitive elections, thereby inducing them to select policies, allocate resources, and adopt institutional positions in ways expected to maximize electoral support.
957
Publications
78.9K
Citations
1.3K
Authors
557
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
218
957
1–5 of 957
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557
New York University
New York, United States
26 h-index
39 publications
3.2K citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
21 h-index
32 publications
5.4K citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
21 h-index
30 publications
3.1K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
21 h-index
31 publications
6.2K citations
Princeton University
Princeton, United States
20 h-index
27 publications
2.2K citations
University of California San Diego
San Diego, United States
19 h-index
26 publications
4.3K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
18 h-index
21 publications
1.4K citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
18 h-index
25 publications
1.9K citations
1–8 of 557
AJPS · 57 publications · 8.5K citations
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JP · 69 publications · 6.6K citations
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47 publications · 5.8K citations
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Repository · 100 publications · 3.2K citations
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CPS · 31 publications · 2.6K citations
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