Gerrymandering Incentives is a theoretical construct in political science that refers to the electoral advantages that politicians or parties gain by manipulating district boundaries to favor their own re-election or electoral success.
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Information gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions
Alexander J. Stewart, Mohsen Mosleh, Marina Diakonova et al. · Nature · 2019 · 183 citations
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Yale University
New Haven, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
128 citations
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
430 citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
233 citations
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
170 citations
Public Policy Institute of California
San Francisco, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
256 citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
412 citations
University of Toronto
Toronto, Canada
3 h-index
5 publications
132 citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
115 citations
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- Legislative Studies Quarterly
4 publications · 223 citations
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Repository · 4 publications · 211 citations
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- Election Law Journal Rules Politics and Policy
ELJ · 4 publications · 121 citations
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- The Journal of Politics
JP · 4 publications · 178 citations
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- American Political Science Review
3 publications · 538 citations
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