Concepedia

Truthful Mechanisms

A Truthful Mechanism is a mechanism in game theory and mechanism design that belongs to the class of strategic interaction protocols and is distinguished by the property that it incentivizes each agent to truthfully report their private information regardless of the reports of others, ensuring dominant strategy truthfulness.

268

Publications

14.7K

Citations

546

Authors

257

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

75

Parents

Publications

268

Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making

Avinash Dixit, Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman · Journal of Political Economy · 1997 · 641 citations · Full text

, , +17

Capacity Choice and Allocation: Strategic Behavior and Supply Chain Performance

Gérard P. Cachon, Martin A. Lariviere · Management Science · 1999 · 491 citations

, , +15

eBay in the Sky

Xia Zhou, Sorabh Gandhi, Subhash Suri et al. · 2008 · 440 citations

, , +16

Approximate mechanism design without money

Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz · 2009 · 320 citations

, , +16

Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms

Adish Singla, Andreas Krause · 2013 · 280 citations

, , +17

1–5 of 268

Authors

546

  1. SD
    Shahar Dobzinski

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    11 publications · 585 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. SD
    Shaddin Dughmi

    University of Southern California, United States

    9 publications · 337 citations

    9

    h-index

  3. DY
    Dejun Yang

    Colorado School of Mines, United States

    9 publications · 701 citations

    9

    h-index

  4. MB
    Moshe Babaioff

    Microsoft (United States), United States

    8 publications · 394 citations

    8

    h-index

  5. DG
    Daniel Grosu

    Wayne State University, United States

    6 publications · 356 citations

    6

    h-index

1–5 of 546

Institutions

257

  1. Hebrew University of Jerusalem

    Jerusalem, Israel

    13 h-index

    25 publications

    1.8K citations

  2. Cornell University

    Ithaca, United States

    12 h-index

    19 publications

    1.5K citations

  3. Stanford University

    Stanford, United States

    11 h-index

    14 publications

    884 citations

  4. Harvard University Press

    Cambridge, United States

    10 h-index

    22 publications

    1.2K citations

  5. Microsoft (United States)

    Redmond, United States

    9 h-index

    14 publications

    1.1K citations

  6. Colorado School of Mines

    Golden, United States

    8 h-index

    8 publications

    575 citations

  7. University of California, Berkeley

    Berkeley, United States

    8 h-index

    14 publications

    1K citations

  8. Tel Aviv University

    Tel Aviv, Israel

    8 h-index

    13 publications

    1.3K citations

1–8 of 257

Venues

  1. arXiv (Cornell University)

    Repository · 11 publications · 185 citations

    10

    h-index

  2. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

    Conference · 11 publications · 502 citations

    10

    h-index

  3. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing

    TMCCI · 9 publications · 574 citations

    9

    h-index

  4. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

    TEAC · 8 publications · 305 citations

    8

    h-index

  5. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 5 publications · 71 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5