Publication | Closed Access
Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms
279
Citations
28
References
2013
Year
Unknown Venue
Behavioral Decision MakingCommunicationMarket DesignOperations ResearchPricing PolicyTask CompletionBiasSearch CostsExperimental EconomicsManagementDecision TheoryMechanism DesignEconomicsCost AllocationDynamic PricingComputer ScienceCrowdsourcingRegret Minimization MechanismsIncentive MechanismBusinessOnline Labor MarketPrice TasksDecision ScienceMicroeconomicsIncentive Model
What price should be offered to a worker for a task in an online labor market? How can one enable workers to express the amount they desire to receive for the task completion? Designing optimal pricing policies and determining the right monetary incentives is central to maximizing requester's utility and workers' profits. Yet, current crowdsourcing platforms only offer a limited capability to the requester in designing the pricing policies and often rules of thumb are used to price tasks. This limitation could result in inefficient use of the requester's budget or workers becoming disinterested in the task.
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