Symmetric Auctions

Symmetric Auctions is an auction model in which all bidders share identical payoff-relevant characteristics and face identical strategic environments, distinguished from asymmetric auction models by the ex-ante indistinguishability of participants in terms of valuation distributions and bidding incentives.

102

Publications

16.9K

Citations

170

Authors

126

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

12

Authors

170

  1. PK
    Paul Klemperer

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 2.5K citations

    4

    h-index

  2. AR
    Amnon Rapoport

    University of Arizona, United States

    3 publications · 65 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. PP
    Paul Pezanis‐Christou

    Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, France

    3 publications · 68 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. OB
    Olivier Bos

    Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, France

    3 publications · 31 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. JH
    John H. Kagel

    The Ohio State University, United States

    2 publications · 92 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 170

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    10 publications · 580 citations

    10

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 9 publications · 391 citations

    9

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 9 publications · 1K citations

    9

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

    5 publications · 365 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. Economics Letters

    4 publications · 97 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5