Subjective Bayesianism is a philosophical and probabilistic framework within confirmation theory that interprets probabilities as degrees of belief held by a rational agent, distinguished by its reliance on subjective prior probabilities that are updated via Bayes’ theorem in light of evidence.
46
Publications
3.6K
Citations
63
Authors
50
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
9
Variants
Personalist Bayesianism
Publications
46
Objections to Bayesian statistics
Andrew Gelman · Bayesian Analysis · 2008 · 281 citations · Full text
Subjective Bayesian Analysis: Principles and Practice
Michael Goldstein · Bayesian Analysis · 2006 · 216 citations · Full text
1–5 of 46
Authors
63
- JW
3
h-index
- CL
2
h-index
- AK
2
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- JL
2
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- CW
2
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1–5 of 63
Institutions
50
University of Kent
Canterbury, United Kingdom
3 h-index
7 publications
175 citations
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
48 citations
University of Wisconsin–Madison
Madison, United States
2 h-index
5 publications
75 citations
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
1K citations
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Minneapolis, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
1K citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
373 citations
Linnaeus University
Vaxjo, Sweden
2 h-index
2 publications
100 citations
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
Canberra, Australia
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
1–8 of 50
Venues
- Bayesian Analysis
7 publications · 626 citations
7
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- Philosophy of Science
4 publications · 242 citations
4
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- The American Statistician
4 publications · 137 citations
4
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- European Journal for Philosophy of Science
2 publications · 58 citations
2
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- Synthese
2 publications · 50 citations
2
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1–5