Sequential First-price Auctions
Sequential First-Price Auctions is a sequential auction mechanism in which agents bid for items in a series of first-price sealed-bid auctions, with each auction's allocation and payment determined by the highest bid and all bids revealed only after submission, distinguishing it from simultaneous or second-price variants by the timing of bids and the pricing rule applied in each stage.
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Sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects
Richard Engelbrecht‐Wiggans · Economics Letters · 1994 · 123 citations
Business, Economics, Mathematics +14
PREDATORY BIDDING IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
Nils‐Henrik M. von der Fehr · Oxford Economic Papers · 1994 · 61 citations
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University of Wisconsin–Madison
Madison, United States
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4 publications
219 citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
116 citations
University of Maryland, College Park
College Park, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
132 citations
University of Technology Sydney
Sydney, Australia
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3 publications
52 citations
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, United States
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2 publications
163 citations

Leibniz University Hannover
Hanover, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
61 citations
Maastricht University
Maastricht, The Netherlands
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2 publications
32 citations
Midorigaoka Hospital
Osaka, Japan
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1 publications
16 citations
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4 publications · 234 citations
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2 publications · 79 citations
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2 publications · 88 citations
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TRR · 2 publications · 36 citations
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