Sequential First-price Auctions

Sequential First-Price Auctions is a sequential auction mechanism in which agents bid for items in a series of first-price sealed-bid auctions, with each auction's allocation and payment determined by the highest bid and all bids revealed only after submission, distinguishing it from simultaneous or second-price variants by the timing of bids and the pricing rule applied in each stage.

31

Publications

1.1K

Citations

57

Authors

48

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

57

  1. HS
    Hani S. Mahmassani

    Northwestern University, United States

    3 publications · 116 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. MF
    Miguel Figliozzi

    Portland State University, United States

    3 publications · 116 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. PJ
    Patrick Jaillet

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States

    3 publications · 116 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. FM
    Flávio Menezes

    The University of Queensland, Australia

    2 publications · 48 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. DB
    Donald B. Hausch

    University of Wisconsin–Madison, United States

    2 publications · 110 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 57

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    4 publications · 234 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Economics Letters

    3 publications · 230 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. International Journal of Game Theory

    2 publications · 79 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Oxford Economic Papers

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. 2

    h-index

1–5