Rule Skepticism is a doctrinal stance within legal theory that belongs to the broader category of legal skepticism, distinguished by its assertion that legal rules do not deterministically govern judicial decisions due to the indeterminacy and malleability of legal texts in practice.
9
Publications
652
Citations
12
Authors
5
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
0
Publications
9
Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules
Warren Goldfarb · The Journal of Philosophy · 1985 · 188 citations
Scepticism, Rules and Language.
Edward Craig, G. P. Baker, P. M. S. Hacker · The Philosophical Quarterly · 1985 · 155 citations
Scepticism, Rules and Language.
Joseph Sartorelli, G. P. Baker, P. M. S. Hacker · The Philosophical Review · 1991 · 135 citations
Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule‐Following Paradox
Scott Soames · Noûs · 1998 · 42 citations
Humanities, Philosophy, Epistemology +10
On The Supposed Defeasibility of Legal Rules
F. Schauer · Current Legal Problems · 1998 · 38 citations
1–5 of 9
Authors
12
- PM
2
h-index
- GP
2
h-index
- HP
1
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- EC
1
h-index
- SS
1
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1–5 of 12
Institutions
5
John F. Kennedy University
Pleasant Hill, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
38 citations
University of Manchester
Manchester, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
22 citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
38 citations
Xerox (France)
Saint-Denis, France
1 h-index
1 publications
22 citations
Princeton University
Princeton, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
42 citations
1–5 of 5
Venues
- The Philosophical Review
1 publications · 135 citations
1
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- The Journal of Philosophy
1 publications · 188 citations
1
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- Choice Reviews Online
CRO · 1 publications · 12 citations
1
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- Human Studies
1 publications · 22 citations
1
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- The Philosophical Quarterly
1 publications · 155 citations
1
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1–5