Quantal Response Equilibrium

Quantal Response Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept in which players choose strategies probabilistically according to a logistic quantal response function that reflects bounded rationality, differing from classical mixed strategy equilibrium by allowing non-zero probabilities for suboptimal responses based on expected payoffs.

101

Publications

9.5K

Citations

161

Authors

119

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

28

Authors

161

  1. TR
    Thomas R. Palfrey

    California Institute of Technology, United States

    15 publications · 5.1K citations

    13

    h-index

  2. JK
    Jacob K. Goeree

    University of Virginia, United States

    7 publications · 836 citations

    7

    h-index

  3. CF
    Colin F. Camerer

    California Institute of Technology, United States

    5 publications · 304 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. CA
    Charles A. Holt

    University of Virginia, United States

    6 publications · 803 citations

    6

    h-index

  5. MT
    Milind Tambe

    University of Southern California, United States

    5 publications · 485 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5 of 161

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    9 publications · 2.9K citations

    9

    h-index

  2. American Political Science Review

    5 publications · 819 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. American Economic Review

    5 publications · 280 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 5 publications · 72 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. Experimental Economics

    4 publications · 1.1K citations

    4

    h-index

1–5