Option Grant Design

Option Grant Design is a formal framework within compensation theory that specifies the structural parameters and contractual terms by which stock options are awarded to individuals, distinguishing it from other incentive mechanisms through its focus on the intentional configuration of grant features such as vesting schedules, exercise prices, expiration dates, and performance conditions.

37

Publications

2.3K

Citations

62

Authors

53

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Authors

62

  1. SS
    Scott Schaefer

    University of Utah, United States

    3 publications · 855 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. PO
    Paul Oyer

    National Bureau of Economic Research, United States

    3 publications · 855 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. JS
    Jayanthi Sunder

    University of Arizona, United States

    2 publications · 125 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. JC
    James C. Sesil

    Rutgers Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, Netherlands

    2 publications · 38 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. EM
    Eliezer M. Fich

    Drexel University, United States

    2 publications · 131 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 62

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 11 publications · 579 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. Journal of Financial Economics

    2 publications · 729 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Journal of Corporate Finance

    2 publications · 228 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of applied corporate finance

    2 publications · 134 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Review of Accounting and Finance

    2 publications · 32 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5