Observable Effort

Observable Effort is an economic concept in the theory of incomplete contracts denoting a principal’s verifiable and contractible measure of an agent’s input or performance that can be monitored and enforced without reliance on subjective or non-contractible outcomes.

25

Publications

2.4K

Citations

48

Authors

32

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Variants

Verifiable Effort

Authors

48

  1. MJ
    Marcel Jansen

    IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Germany

    2 publications · 59 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. JC
    James Costain

    Bank of Spain, Spain

    2 publications · 59 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. RK
    Roman Kapuściński

    University of Michigan, United States

    2 publications · 465 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. DA
    David A. Butz

    University of Michigan, United States

    2 publications · 465 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. CL
    Cuihong Li

    University of Connecticut, United States

    2 publications · 107 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 48

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 4 publications · 110 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    3 publications · 535 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. Oxford Economic Papers

    1 publications · 22 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. International Economic Review

    1 publications · 235 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Dental Education

    1 publications · 19 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5