Niskanen Model

The Niskanen Model is a theoretical framework in public choice theory that posits bureaucrats act as utility-maximizing agents who seek to maximize their agency's budget and output to enhance personal benefits, thereby differing from models assuming public interest motivation.

24

Publications

2K

Citations

32

Authors

16

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Variants

Budget-maximizing Model

Authors

32

  1. AB
    André Blais

    Université de Montréal, Canada

    2 publications · 220 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. SD
    Stéphane Dion

    Université de Sherbrooke, Canada

    2 publications · 220 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. WA
    William A. Niskanen

    Cato Institute, United States

    2 publications · 240 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SZ
    Shmuel Zamir

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    1 publications · 148 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. BL
    Bruce L. Benson

    Florida State University, United States

    1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 32

Venues

  1. American Journal of Political Science

    AJPS · 2 publications · 64 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Southern Economic Journal

    2 publications · 248 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Journal of Mathematical Psychology

    1 publications · 148 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 1 publications · 18 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Theoretical Politics

    JTP · 1 publications · 78 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5