Concepedia

Multi-agent Moral Hazard

Multi-Agent Moral Hazard is a theoretical construct in agency theory that refers to the inefficiencies arising when multiple agents exert unobservable effort levels and free-ride on one another under shared incentives, leading to suboptimal collective performance due to misaligned individual incentives.

43

Publications

3.6K

Citations

67

Authors

64

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

5

Parents

Publications

43

Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents

Dilip Mookherjee · The Review of Economic Studies · 1984 · 522 citations

, , +17

Playing it safe? Managerial preferences, risk, and agency conflicts

Todd A. Gormley, David A. Matsa · Journal of Financial Economics · 2016 · 493 citations

, , +14

Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

Hideshi Itoh · Econometrica · 1991 · 484 citations

, , +13

Collaborating

Alessandro Bonatti, Johannes Hörner · American Economic Review · 2011 · 216 citations · Full text

, , +13

Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams

Eric Rasmusen · The RAND Journal of Economics · 1987 · 207 citations

, , +13

1–5 of 43

Authors

67

  1. TS
    Tomas Sjöström

    Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, United States

    2 publications · 159 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. HI
    Hideshi Itoh

    Hitotsubashi University, Japan

    2 publications · 504 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. TA
    Todd A. Gormley

    Washington University in St. Louis, United States

    2 publications · 654 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SB
    Sandeep Baliga

    Northwestern University, United States

    2 publications · 159 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. LC
    Lin Chen

    Université Paris-Sud, France

    2 publications · 84 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 67

Institutions

64

  1. Northwestern University

    Evanston, United States

    4 h-index

    4 publications

    763 citations

  2. Yale University

    New Haven, United States

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    226 citations

  3. Zhejiang University

    Hangzhou, China

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    84 citations

  4. Laboratoire de Recherche en Informatique

    Gif-sur-Yvette, France

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    84 citations

  5. New York University

    New York, United States

    2 h-index

    5 publications

    186 citations

  6. Singapore University of Technology and Design

    Singapore, Singapore

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    84 citations

  7. National Bureau of Economic Research

    Cambridge, United States

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    654 citations

  8. Chinese University of Hong Kong

    Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    112 citations

1–8 of 64

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 5 publications · 278 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. The RAND Journal of Economics

    3 publications · 354 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 3 publications · 71 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. The Review of Economic Studies

    2 publications · 542 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Theoretical Economics

    TE · 2 publications · 73 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5